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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1865, the Confederacy fell.1 This is not a secret. In April 1865, in the 
Virginia village of Appomattox Court House, Confederate General, Robert E. 
Lee, signed the terms of surrender, thus triggering the beginning of the end of 
the American Civil War.2 As writer and historian Fletcher Pratt describes the 
scene, after signing the terms of surrender, Lee “clasped hands with [Union 
General, Ulysses S. Grant], stepped to the door and rode out of history.”3 But 
neither Lee nor the Civil War has ridden out of history. Indeed, a deep fascination 
with the American Civil War persists.4 Well over 150 years since the first shots 
of the war rang out, much can be learned from America’s bloodiest historical 
moment.5 
To that end, this Article looks back to history and isolates but one aspect 
of the Civil War as instructive for the modern political climate—the troubled 
leadership of the Confederacy’s president, Jefferson Davis. Indeed, Davis’s 
leadership was so troubled and problematic that some historians have argued that 
“[i]f the Union and Confederacy had exchanged presidents with one another, the 
Confederacy might have won its independence.”6 
This Article argues that a significant issue with Davis’s leadership was 
his inability to respond adequately to the protest and political pushback7 
(meaning protest, criticism, and unrest that challenges laws or policies and 
engenders debate on any number of issues) that he faced. Indeed, Davis often 
* J.D., Duke University School of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to
Professor H. Jefferson Powell for his encouragement with this project as well as his thoughtful
edits, suggestions, and advice along the way. Thanks also to the editors of the West Virginia Law
Review for their hard work on this Article.
1  See TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, LIBERTY & UNION: THE CIVIL WAR ERA AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 337–38 (2016). 
2  FLETCHER PRATT, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR: ORDEAL BY FIRE 386 (1948). 
Jefferson Davis, the Confederacy’s president, was not captured until May 1865. David K. Watson, 
The Trial of Jefferson Davis, 24 YALE L.J. 669, 669–70 (1915). Moreover, Davis was not quite 
ready to surrender after Appomattox, hoping to “continue the rebellion from the west.” See Dwight 
J. Davis, The Legal Travails of Jefferson Davis: A Review and Lessons Learned, 23 J. S. LEGAL 
HIST. 27, 37 (2015).
3  PRATT, supra note 2, at 386. 
 4  See, e.g., TONY HORWITZ, CONFEDERATES IN THE ATTIC: DISPATCHES FROM THE UNFINISHED
CIVIL WAR 387–90 (1998). 
5  When it comes to the Civil War, there is much truth in William Faulkner’s frequently quoted 
quip that “[t]he past is never dead. It’s not even past.” WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 
92 (1951). 
6  JAMES M. MCPHERSON, EMBATTLED REBEL: JEFFERSON DAVIS AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF 4 
(2014). This point only serves to highlight the problems with Davis’s leadership. 
7  This Article switches between use of the terms protest and pushback as appropriate. In some 
sense, protest is a specific form of pushback. 
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ignored much of the political pushback he received or quelled the protest through 
significant exercises of executive power.8 Why is this relevant in the modern era 
and, specifically, in 2019? To begin, 2019 is similarly rife with pushback and 
protest directed towards the president. Like Davis, President Donald Trump faces 
pushback and protest from all corners of American democracy—the people, 
some state and local governments, and other branches of the federal 
government.9 Additionally, President Trump, like Davis, has responded at times 
by adopting a more expansive version of executive power to disrupt or quell 
pushback and protest. Perhaps, the most obvious example is President Trump’s 
decision to declare a national emergency and build a wall at the border with 
Mexico.10 Although the Supreme Court recently overturned a stay on 
construction of the wall, the litigation surrounding the border wall continues.11 
Of course, President Trump is not the first president to exercise robust 
executive power in the face of political pushback from Congress or the American 
people. Even George Washington exercised this type of robust executive power 
when grain farmers on the Western Frontier engaged in significant protest of the 
“whiskey tax.”12 Indeed, Washington’s response to this protest included riding 
at the head of an army sent to suppress the now infamous Whiskey Rebellion.13 
Years later, in the face of the dramatic political pushback that culminated in the 
Civil War, Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus and declared 
8  See infra Part III. 
 9  See, e.g., Peter Baker, A Growing Chorus of Republican Critics for Trump’s Foreign Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/us/politics/trump-foreign-
policy.html; Stephen Collinson, Trump’s Immigration Reversal Creates Its Own Chaos, CNN POL. 
(June 22, 2018, 12:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/trump-family-separation-
executive-order-chaos/index.html. 
10  Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional Clash, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-
emergency-trump.html. 
11  Linda Greenhouse, On the Border Wall, the Supreme Court Caves to Trump, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/opinion/trump-supreme-court-border-
wall.html. The Supreme Court has upheld President Trump’s use of military funds to build part of 
the border wall. See Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 19A60, 2019 WL 3369425 (July 26, 2019). 
Although the Supreme Court has allowed construction of the border wall to proceed, litigation 
continues over President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency to build the border wall. See 
id.; see also Jessica Taylor, Supreme Court Lets Trump Border Wall Move Forward, But Legal 
Fight Still Looms, NPR (July 26, 2019, 7:47 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/26/745785115/supreme-court-lets-trump-border-wall-move-
forward-but-legal-fight-still-looms. As of Summer 2019, an appeal regarding President Trump’s 
actions was pending before the Ninth Circuit. 
12  See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE WASHINGTON 224–25 (2004) [hereinafter 
ELLIS, GEORGE WASHINGTON]. 
13  See id. 
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martial law.14 Fast forward to the 1940s, in the swirl of political unrest and fear 
associated with World War II, Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive order 
authorizing internment of Japanese resident aliens as well as Americans of 
Japanese descent.15 These are just three examples of particularly assertive 
exercises of executive power. There are, of course, many more. 
On the other hand, in the face of significant protest and pushback, some 
presidents have taken a different approach. For example, Richard Nixon created 
a commission to understand the differing views of the anti-war protesters on 
college campuses, notwithstanding attempts at more extreme and potentially 
illegal measures.16 Lyndon B. Johnson, in the face of growing Civil Rights 
protests, did not leave it to the courts to handle or to Congress’s timeline. But he 
also did not simply issue an executive order to try to resolve the matter as he saw 
fit. Rather, President Johnson worked within the structure of government to 
persuade Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 
When considering these moments, among others, of significant political 
pushback and the accompanying presidential response, a question emerges: how 
should the president respond? In considering this question, an examination of 
Davis’s leadership offers insights that an examination of George Washington or 
Richard Nixon, for example, does not and cannot offer. Specifically, Davis is a 
powerful and rare example when it comes to evaluating a president’s response to 
pushback and protest because the Confederacy fell. In other words, the 
Confederacy is a unique test case for understanding the significance of 
presidential responses to pushback and protest because everyone knows how the 
story ends, which means the focus can be on why the story ended as it did. 
Further, the similarities between the types of protesters and the themes 
of the pushback in the Confederacy and in 2019 are striking. First, when 
considering the similarities in the political climates of the Confederacy and 
today, it is worth mentioning that although the Confederacy may have ostensibly 
championed states’ rights, it maintained a heavily centralized and regulated 
14  President Lincoln first issued a proclamation suspending habeas corpus. Proclamation No. 
1, 13 Stat. 730 (Sept. 24, 1862). Congress, later, validated the suspension of habeas corpus through 
the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863. 37 Cong. Ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863). 
15  Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942); Proclamation No. 2537, 7 Fed. 
Reg. 329 (Jan. 17, 1942). 
16  See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST, WASHINGTON, D.C., THE REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST (1970), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED083899.pdf; see also Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. 
Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/12/22/archives/huge-cia-operation-reported-in-
u-s-against-antiwar-forces-other.html. 
17  See Michael O’Donnell, How LBJ Saved the Civil Rights Act, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/04/what-the-hells-the-presidency-
for/358630/. 
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national government, even more so than the Union at the time.18 Unsurprisingly, 
that centralization often did not sit well with Confederate citizens who believed 
that the Confederacy would be a bastion for states’ rights.19 But this tension 
between an ostensible concern for states’ rights (or a smaller role for national 
government) and a robust exercise of executive power should sound familiar. 
Indeed, President Trump, among many other U.S. presidents, has confronted this 
exact same tension.20 Additionally, Davis often faced pushback from state 
governments that refused to heed the executive branch’s determination regarding 
the constitutionality of certain laws passed by the Confederate Congress.21 
Similarly, some state attorneys general have unabashedly opposed certain of the 
Trump administration’s policies.22 Further, like Davis, President Trump faces 
large protests from women concerned with basic human rights.23 And these are 
18  See, e.g., EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERACY AS A REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE 58–59 
(1971) (“The Confederate government, albeit unwittingly, transformed the South from a state rights 
confederation into a centralized, national state.”). 
19  See infra Part IV. 
 20  See, e.g., Lauren Camera, With Push for States’ Rights, Trump Team Stirs Fear, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (Feb. 27, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/articles/2017-02-27/trump-administrations-calls-to-return-power-to-states-stirs-fear; John 
Stoehr, The GOP Only Selectively Cares About States’ Rights, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/2018/01/10/the-gop-only-selectively-cares-about-states-rights/; 
see also Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration’s Attack on 
Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEX. L.
REV. 1247, 1284 (2019) (discussing “fair-weather federalism” as well as a “systematic change in 
attitudes” and “potentially shifting ideological valence of judicial enforcement of federalism”). 
Even President Jefferson wrestled with this tension, notably when it came to the Louisiana 
Purchase. See JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 204–12 
(1996) [hereinafter ELLIS, THOMAS JEFFERSON]. Indeed, President Jefferson “violated his most 
cherished political principles several times over in order to guarantee the most expansive version 
of the ‘noble bargain,’ and he temporarily made himself into just the kind of monarchical chief 
magistrate he had warned against.” Id. at 208. When it came to the Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson 
“managed to implement decisions that defied in so many ways his long-standing commitment to 
limitations on executive power and the near-sacred character of republican principles.” Id. at 211. 
21  David P. Currie, Through the Looking-Glass: The Confederate Constitution in Congress, 
1861–1865, 90 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1264 n.32 (2004). 
22  See Democratic State Attorneys General Begin Trump Pushback, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 
31, 2017, 3:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/31/democratic-state-attorneys-general-
begin-trump-pushback.html; see also Alan Neuhauser, State Attorneys General Lead the Charge 
Against President Donald Trump, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2017-10-27/state-attorneys-general-lead-the-
charge-against-president-donald-trump. 
23  Indeed, during the Civil War, many Confederate women engaged in various protests, 
including the food riots to send a message to Davis that their basic needs (i.e., adequate food) be 
provided for or they would encourage their husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons to desert. See 
STEPHANIE MCCURRY, CONFEDERATE RECKONING: POWER AND POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR SOUTH 
190–92 (2010). Their efforts were effective. By the spring of 1863, the Confederate government 
was ready to “revise and reconsider a variety of policies from taxation to impressment, 
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just a few similarities. The punchline is that just as Davis encountered a political 
climate rife with pushback from Confederate citizens, state governments, and 
other branches of the Confederate government,24 President Trump is 
encountering a similar political climate, 25 including what could be considered 
the ultimate form of pushback from within the federal government: a formal 
impeachment inquiry.26 
To be clear, although this Article takes a close look at the problems with 
Davis’s leadership as a way to understand the significance of presidential 
responses to protest, this Article does not argue for the legitimacy of secession 
and the Confederacy. This Article simply focuses on Davis as a product of the 
American political tradition and as someone who applied American notions of 
executive power to lead a government modeled after the United States. To that 
end, recognizing the lessons from Davis’s presidency does not require an 
acceptance or approval of the Confederacy. 
With that caveat, working from the premise that this country is founded 
on a tradition of dispute27 and considering the lessons from Davis’s presidency, 
this Article contends that protest and pushback are vital to a healthy democracy 
and its continued existence. It is in the face of such disruptions where executive 
restraint may be most important.28 On the other hand, when confronted with 
certain disruptions, a president may be justified in adopting a more assertive 
executive response. Every president will face political pushback, but not all 
presidents will respond the same way or achieve the same results. Davis’s 
presidency provides a unique window into the significance of a president’s 
response to pushback and offers a way of thinking about presidential responses 
to pushback in the current political climate. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts before concluding. Part II defines 
two categories of protest and pushback to guide the discussion of presidential 
responses to such protest and pushback: disruptions to the domestic order and 
disruptions to the governmental order. Part II then explains a rudimentary 
methodology for identifying these two primary types of disruptions. From there, 
Part II discusses, in broad strokes, the value of protest and political pushback. 
conscription, and exemption that bore on the problems of labor and subsistence” in an effort to 
help the Confederacy’s poorest citizens. Id. at 192. 
24  See infra Section III.A 
25  See infra Part III. 
26  Nicholas Fandos, Nancy Pelosi Announces Formal Impeachment Inquiry of Trump, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/democrats-
impeachment-trump.html?login=email&auth=login-email. 
27  See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 404–05 (2007); see also Ashlee Paxton-Turner, Preserving 
Tradition: The Antiquities Act & Perpetuating American Democracy, 15 DARTMOUTH L.J. 102, 
115 (2017) (discussing how “American history is rooted in ‘traditions of argument’”). 
28  Exercising executive restraint, for the purposes of this Article, means avoiding the 
temptation to use executive power to quash or silence protest and discontent. 
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Part III first discusses Jefferson Davis’s presidency and provides a brief overview 
of the political landscape that Davis encountered before turning to Davis’s 
responses to protest and pushback. Part III then contemplates the lessons learned 
from Davis’s responses to protest and pushback. Part IV considers the current 
political climate by taking inventory of some of the protest and pushback 
President Trump has encountered as well as some of his responses. Part IV then 
reflects on the lessons from Davis’s responses and the tension between 
government-in-theory and government-in-practice that those lessons reveal. 
II. DEFINING DISRUPTIONS
Before evaluating a president’s response to political pushback and 
weighing the significance of Davis’s response, it is necessary and helpful to 
define two general categories of pushback that a president might confront: 
disruptions to the domestic order and disruptions to the governmental order. This 
Article uses these categories as tools to structure and guide a discussion of 
presidential responses to pushback. Of course, not every instance of criticism and 
protest will fit neatly into one category. Rather, the two categories merely 
bookend a spectrum of disruptions. Further, identifying instances of pushback as 
disrupting the domestic order or the governmental order is not meant to assign 
normative value to the merits of the pushback. 
A. Disruptions to the Domestic Order vs. the Governmental Order
For purposes of this Article, disruptions to the domestic order refer to 
protests that disrupt complacency and contentedness with the current social order 
as well as current policies and politics. In other words, this type of political 
pushback fuels unrest among the American people and engenders ongoing debate 
on matters the public finds important. To that end, this variety of protest may 
have important and longstanding effects on American society and the laws that 
govern it. As general examples, a disruption to the domestic order might be a 
protest regarding civil rights or opposing a war. A current example would be the 
swell of protest around the latest abortion laws.29 
A disruption to the governmental order, however, goes beyond protest 
for political, legal, or social change. It does more than provoke unrest and debate 
and instead threatens the stability of the Union. Such a disruption interferes with 
the government’s ability to function. In other words, this type of protest prevents 
the government from carrying out core responsibilities such as the power to tax, 
regulate commerce, or address issues of national security. Notable examples 
29  See Timothy Williams, With Most States Under One Party’s Control, America Grows More 
Divided, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/us/state-legislatures-
partisan-polarized.html. 
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would be Colonial America’s protest of British rule,30 the Whiskey Rebellion,31 
the Dorr Rebellion,32 the Confederacy’s secession from the Union,33 and, on an 
admittedly somewhat smaller scale, labor strikes to the extent they disrupted 
interstate commerce in the late nineteenth century or national security in the 
1980s.34 It is worth emphasizing at this point in the Article that these categories 
are part of a spectrum, any given instance of pushback may share characteristics 
of both categories. 
1. Disruptions to the Domestic Order: Four Dead in Ohio,35 Civil
Rights, and the Alien and Sedition Acts
Defining the two primary categories of political pushback in broad 
terms, however, is only so helpful. As such, this Article next considers some 
specific examples of each type of disruption. 
A discussion of political pushback that provokes unrest and ongoing 
debate without any reference to the Vietnam-era and Civil Rights protests would 
be remiss. After President Nixon announced the invasion of Cambodia on April 
30  The famous Boston Tea Party is but one example of Colonial America’s protest against 
British rule. See Alison Peck, Revisiting the Original “Tea Party”: The Historical Roots of 
Regulating Food Consumption in America, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (discussing “the Boston 
Tea Party as a symbol of anti-establishment populism that successfully subverted an unpopular 
government regime”). 
31  When Congress passed an excise tax on whiskey in 1791, grain farmers began to protest, 
arguing that the tax “fell disproportionately on distilleries.” ELLIS, GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra 
note 12, at 224. Washington decided to “crush the insurrection” by personally taking command of 
the troops. Id. He later justified this response to Congress “on the grounds that ‘certain self-created 
societies’ were in fact subversive organizations that threatened the survival of the national union.” 
Id. at 225. Although Washington valued the citizenry’s right to dissent, he “insist[ed] that dissent 
could not take the form of flagrant violation of federal authority.” Id. It is that flagrant violation 
that helps distinguish threats to the governmental order. 
32  In 1842, a group of Rhode Island citizens tried to replace Rhode Island’s original charter 
with a new constitution. Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of 
Crime, and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 56 
(1997). Under the new constitution, Thomas Dorr was elected governor, while Samuel King had 
been elected under the original charter. Id. Despite King’s pleas, the federal government refused 
to intervene. Id. This situation was maddeningly disruptive to the Rhode Island government’s 
ability to function, and in that sense, the Dorr Rebellion is perhaps best described as a disruption 
to the state governmental order given that the federal government refused to intervene. 
33  See THOMAS, supra note 18, at 1–2 (discussing how during the Civil War, secessionists 
sought “independence, violent overthrow of an existing political structure, [and] political 
separation”). 
34  See infra Section II.A.2. 
 35  This subtitle is borrowed from “Ohio” written by Neil Young and performed by Crosby, 
Stills, Nash, and Young—a song which tidily captures sentiments regarding the turbulence of the 
Vietnam era and the inevitable disruption to the domestic order. CROSBY, STILLS, NASH, & YOUNG, 
Ohio, on SO FAR (Atlantic 1970). 
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30, 1970, university students across the country rallied in vehement protest.36 
Perhaps, most famous was the student response at Kent State University, where 
four students were ultimately killed by members of the National Guard.37 
President Nixon had not called upon the National Guard to respond to these 
student protesters.38 In fact, in an effort to avoid what could have become a 
constitutional crisis, President Nixon attempted to reach out to student protesters 
across the country, despite sometimes referring to them as the “bums blowing up 
campuses.”39 Indeed, just five days after the Kent State shooting, President Nixon 
responded to the pushback he faced by speaking with the thousands of gathered 
anti-war protesters at the Lincoln Memorial in the early hours of the morning of 
May 9, 1970.40 President Nixon also established the President’s Commission on 
Campus Unrest.41 Although the escalation of the Vietnam War and shooting at 
Kent State intensified the anti-war protests, it would be unfair to characterize 
those protests as impeding the ordinary functioning of the government or its 
ability to carry out core responsibilities. After all, the government did not come 
to a grinding halt; it even maintained the U.S. military’s presence in Vietnam for 
several more years.42 
Although President Nixon also engaged in some extreme measures, such 
as illegal intelligence gathering regarding the anti-war leaders,43 he presumably 
recognized that he could not flatly ignore the protesters or silence them without 
at least appearing to consider their concerns.44 How a president chooses to 
respond to protest is not confined to how he ultimately attempts to resolve the 
debate. In other words, the rhetoric he uses is an equally important part of 
presidential responses to pushback. Language is powerful; “[t]he use of words is 
to express ideas.”45 To that end, the rhetoric a president chooses communicates 
certain ideas and conveys a specific message. That message has an independent 
role in either tempering protest, engendering further debate, or escalating protest. 
President Nixon appears to have been well aware of this fact. Indeed, his 
36  HOWARD MEANS, 67 SHOTS: KENT STATE AND THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE 5 (2016). 
37  See generally id. 
38  See id. at 41 (explaining that the Ohio governor had called upon the National Guard). 
 39  Id. at 7, 24. See also Howard Means, The Story of the Really Weird Night Richard Nixon 
Hung Out with Hippies at the Lincoln Memorial, WASHINGTONIAN (May 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonian.com/2016/05/17/richard-nixon-kent-state-protests-white-house-
lincoln-memorial/.  
40  See Means, supra note 39. 
41  Id. See also MEANS, supra note 36, at 24. 
 42  In 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed, which included a cease-fire and set in motion 
efforts at planning troop withdrawal. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-
Nam, Jan. 27, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1, 935 U.N.T.S. 2. 
43  See Hersh, supra note 16. 
44  See MEANS, supra note 36, at 7, 24. 
45  THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
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administration has, at times, been credited with reviving the phrase “but will it 
play in Peoria?”46 
Additionally, the Civil Rights Movement, which had a profound effect 
on the cornerstones of everyday life and fundamentally altered how 
constitutional provisions are interpreted, is equally instructive. By the early 
1960s, the Supreme Court had already issued opinions changing the social 
landscape such as Brown v. Board of Education47 in 1954. But the Jim Crow era 
was far from over. President Lyndon Johnson, in the face of significant Civil 
Rights protest, could have responded in any number of ways, including hoping 
the courts might intervene as they had a decade before with Brown v. Board or 
that Congress would eventually pass the Civil Rights Act. Alternatively, 
President Johnson could have issued an executive order attempting to address, at 
least in part, certain important issues such as segregation in public places and 
employment discrimination. Doing so may have sent a forceful message to the 
Jim Crow South. Instead, President Johnson, working within the structure of 
government, persuaded Congress to get the Civil Rights Act passed sooner rather 
than later.48 
But even long before Vietnam and the Civil Rights era, presidents faced 
protests and political pushback that threatened the domestic order. Facing 
significant protest and pushback from Thomas Jefferson and the Republican 
party regarding a possible war with France, President John Adams signed into 
law the Alien and Sedition Acts passed by the Federalist Congress.49 Notably, 
the Sedition Act made it a crime to make any “false, scandalous, and malicious 
writing against the government, Congress, or the President, or any attempt to 
excite against them . . . the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to 
stir up sedition.”50 Under this law, most of those punished were editors of 
Republican newspapers.51 Although President Adams did not ask Congress to 
pass the law,52 it is worth mentioning as an extreme response to political 
pushback. It is true that much of this protest engendered widespread debate on 
46  See William Safire, On Language; Playing in Pretoria, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 1985), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/29/magazine/on-language-playing-in-pretoria.html. But see 
David H. Remer, Playing in Peoria, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1985), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/03/magazine/l-playing-in-peoria-127721.html (arguing that 
the phrase did not originate in the Nixon administration and that Safire’s article is incorrect on this 
point). 
47  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 48  See SYLVIA ELLIS, FREEDOM’S PRAGMATIST: LYNDON JOHNSON AND CIVIL RIGHTS 2–3 
(2013). But see CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT 2–5 (2014) (discussing that in some sense popular history has exaggerated Johnson’s role). 
49 DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 504–05 (2001). 
50  Id. at 505. 
51  Id. at 506. 
52  Id. at 504. 
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foreign policy and America’s relationship with France, but it hardly threatened 
government operations or justified the extreme response of the Sedition Act. 
These examples illustrate protest and pushback that fueled widespread 
debate and affected daily life for many Americans. At the same time, the 
government continued functioning, and the Union did not suddenly suffer a 
precarious existence. What these examples also demonstrate is that in the face of 
significant protest and pushback, a president’s only recourse is hardly robust 
executive action. Instead, presidents may respond in a manner that allows them 
to recognize the concerns prompting the pushback and, where appropriate,53 
make efforts to ameliorate the problem by working with other branches of 
government. 
2. Disruptions to the Governmental Order: The Whiskey Rebellion and
Labor Strikes
The Whiskey Rebellion is an early and famous example of protest and 
pushback threating the governmental order. When frontiersmen protested the 
“Whiskey tax,” Washington responded by leading a military charge to quash the 
rebellion54—a far cry from a mild response. To be fair, however, the Whiskey 
Rebellion represented a significant threat not only to the functioning of the young 
government by impeding Congress’s power to tax but also the young 
government’s very survival.55 Indeed, Washington justified his response to 
Congress on the basis that this type of protest “threatened the survival of the 
national union.”56 In explaining his decision, Washington “was not disputing the 
right of aggrieved citizens to dissent, but he was insisting that dissent could not 
take the form of flagrant violation of federal authority,”57 a sentiment with which 
Congress agreed.58 
Threats to the functioning of the government did not end with 
Washington. In the late 1800s, President Grover Cleveland faced the Pullman 
Strike, which signaled the tension between labor and capital.59 The Pullman 
workers had continued to receive wage reductions while rents had remained the 
same in their company town.60 This strike, which began in Chicago, ultimately 
53  In the case of the Sedition Act, President Adams, with the support of the Federalist 
Congress, actually made things worse. 
54  ELLIS, GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 12, at 224. 
55  Id. at 224–25. 
56  Id. at 225. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
 59  See ALMONT LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE: THE STORY OF A UNIQUE EXPERIMENT AND OF 
A GREAT LABOR UPHEAVAL 1–2 (1942). 
60  HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 279–80 (1980). 
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escalated to a nationwide railroad strike.61 In response, President Cleveland sent 
federal troops to enforce an injunction, thereby ending the strike, a decision 
upheld by the Supreme Court in In re Debs.62 
Specifically, in Debs, the Court enjoined the labor strike because it was 
interfering with interstate commerce and the federal mail.63 More importantly, 
the Court went on to explain that the president could have used force to control 
the disturbance.64 But why? It is unlikely that anyone thought that the whole 
government would collapse if the labor unrest was not quelled. But disrupting 
the governmental order is not limited to the fall of the nation because interference 
with core governmental responsibilities creates a situation that (1) makes it 
difficult for the government to carry out its role, and (2) undermines the viability 
of the government. In other words, the threatened collapse of the nation is not 
the only moment when the government cannot effectively perform its role and 
responsibilities and when the government’s continued viability is threatened. As 
to this latter point, a national government that loses its ability to regulate 
interstate commerce effectively, for example, begins to lose control over its core 
responsibilities. The continued viability of a government that cannot control its 
core responsibilities is (arguably) in doubt. 
In Debs, the labor strike “threatened the basic conditions of public peace 
and order upon which all social relations, including market relations, were 
built.”65 For some, the strike signaled the possibility of class warfare.66 The strike 
then escalated to a nationwide strike, severely interfering with the government’s 
functioning because interstate commerce and federal mail were put in jeopardy. 
At that point, the disruption to the domestic order had evolved into a disruption 
61  See id. at 279–81. 
62  158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
63  Id. at 599. 
 64  Id. See also L. H. LaRue, Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 
373, 391 (1987) (discussing a letter from Justice Harlan who “makes clear that the fundamental 
issue is controlling any ‘disturbance [such] as that raised by Debs,’ so that the social order is not 
disturbed”). Justice Harlan, though, is likely not using “social order” the way this Article has used 
the term. Justice Harlan’s use of “social order” is likely closer to Justice Brewer’s concerns about 
“the general confusion into which the interstate commerce of the country was thrown; [and] the 
forcible interference with that commerce.” Debs, 158 U.S. at 592. But it is important to emphasize 
that this use of “social order” is not the same as this Article’s use of “social order” to describe the 
disruption to the social order of the Civil War South that would have occurred had Davis succeeded 
in both arming the slaves and granting them their freedom in return for fighting for the 
Confederacy. See Currie, supra note 21, at 1300–01. Instead, the Confederate Congress “ultimately 
authorize[d] the arming of black soldiers . . . but specifying that they should not be freed without 
the consent of both their owners and of the state in which they lived.” Id. at 1305–06. 
65  Robert W. Gordon, The Constitution of Liberal Order at the Troubled Beginnings of the 
Modern State, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 373, 377 (2013). 
66  In the lead up to the strike, workers appealed to the union, citing five reductions in wages, 
“amounting to nearly thirty per cent, and rents had not fallen.” ZINN, supra note 60, at 279–80. 
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to the governmental order by disturbing interstate commerce to the point of 
creating “general confusion”67 followed by “forcible interference with that 
commerce.”68 There is some debate about whether the Supreme Court was right 
about this point—that the level of disruption from the nationwide railroad strike 
had escalated to the point of warranting federal intervention. And to be fair, a 
president may want to be careful in following the approach taken by President 
Cleveland whenever protest erupts. After all, sending federal troops to break up 
a protest or enforce an order because of “interference with commerce” could be 
used as a pretext for federal intervention in any number of instances of protest.69 
As will be discussed further in latter portions of this Article, the type of response 
a president offers is vital, and part of determining the appropriateness of a 
response depends on understanding the extent of the disruption. Whether Debs 
is correct about the appropriateness of sending federal troops to enforce an order, 
it is certainly fair to conclude that the nationwide railroad strike interfered with 
basic government functions. 
This Article next considers the air traffic controllers’ strike in the 1980s 
as a more contemporary example of disruptions to the governmental order. 
There, President Reagan’s response to the air traffic controller strike shares 
similarities with President Cleveland’s response to the railroad strike. In 1981, 
when the union demanded better pay and better working conditions by declaring 
a strike, President Reagan considered the strike as a threat to national security.70 
Similar to the strikers in Debs, the air traffic controllers were disturbing 
cornerstones of the governmental order such as national security and 
commerce.71 In response, President Reagan first demanded that the striking 
controllers return to work within forty-eight hours or lose their jobs.72 
Approximately 11,000 controllers ignored the order, so true to his word, 
President Reagan fired them and banned them from federal service for life.73 
Indeed, although President Reagan did not send federal troops to confront the air 
traffic controllers, like President Cleveland, his intervention effectively removed 
the pushback. But under Debs, when pushback “forcibly obstruct[s]” 
cornerstones of the governmental order (such as national security or interstate 
commerce), an assertive executive response that altogether removes (or at least 
67  Debs, 158 U.S. at 592. 
68  Id. 
 69  See Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Riot Control and the Use of Federal Troops, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 638, 648 (1968). 
70  See JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE THAT CHANGED AMERICA 7 (2011). 
71  See id. at 300–01 (discussing the scope of the strike). 
72  See id. at 7. 
 73  See id. at 321–22. President Clinton later lifted this ban during his presidency. See id. at 
357, 368. 
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significantly undermines) the pushback may be justified.74 Of course, just 
because assertive executive action that quells protest may be justified does not 
mean such power must be exercised. Indeed, a president could alternatively 
acquiesce to the demands of the protesters, which could require a different strand 
of executive action. To that end, it is worth emphasizing that disruptions to the 
governmental order are just as important as disruptions to the domestic order; the 
distinction simply signifies what type of response may be justified. 
B. Identifying Disruptions
Although the above examples are helpful for contextualizing disruptions 
to the domestic order and the governmental order, it is useful to have a 
rudimentary test for identifying disruptions, particularly in moments without the 
benefit of hindsight. Because political pushback and protest are closely related 
to core free speech considerations, First Amendment jurisprudence is an 
appropriate starting point. Specifically, the test in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District75 sheds light on which type of disruption 
may be unfolding at any given time. In Tinker, the question was whether a black 
armband in protest of the Vietnam War “materially and substantially” interfered 
with “the work of the schools or the rights of other students.”76 The distinction 
between disruptions to the domestic and governmental order fundamentally asks 
a similar question: does the protest “materially and substantially” interfere with 
the work of the government? 
Answering this question is, of course, harder than merely asking it, and 
in some instances, it may be up to the courts to answer whether the president’s 
response was ultimately justified. In Tinker, the majority first held that the black 
armbands were pure speech and that in order to justify suppressing it, the school 
officials had to show that the speech would “materially and substantially 
interfere” with the school’s operations.77 From there, the majority determined 
that suppressing speech out of a mere fear of disruption was unacceptable.78 In 
fact, although the black armbands “caused discussion outside of the 
74  For a discussion considering the use of federal troops as the President’s “constitutional 
ability to respond to an emergency,” see Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: 
The Domestic Use of the Military and the Power of the Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY 
J. 537, 597 (2014). This Article, however, contends that the use of federal troops as well as other
significant executive responses, such as firing nearly 11,000 air traffic controllers and banning
them from further federal service for life, share much in common. But it may be that a disruption
to the governmental order can escalate to a national emergency warranting the use of federal force.
See id.
75  393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
76  Id. at 508–09. 
77  Id. at 509. 
78  See id. at 509–10. 
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classrooms,”79 there was no disruption to the regular school order.80 Similarly, 
political protests may cause discussions and even disruptions to the ordinary 
domestic order—just like those outside discussions may have caused slight 
disruptions to the normal school day even if not to the regular school order—but 
until such protests rise to the level of threats to the governmental order, they 
should be embraced rather than stifled by the president. Importantly, this test 
accords with the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Debs that robust executive 
action would have been proper given the extent to which the labor strikes 
interfered with the functioning of the government.81 In other words, a material 
and substantial interference with commerce or national security may justify 
expansive executive authority. But just as “undifferentiated fear or apprehension 
of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression,”82 
that same fear of disturbance to the domestic order is not enough to overcome 
the right (and long tradition) to protest and question the government’s actions. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer83 implicitly recognizes this point as to threats to the governmental order. 
There, President Truman engaged in assertive executive action in seizing the 
steel mills, a decision which the Supreme Court overturned.84 In 1951, steel 
companies and their employees disagreed over the terms of the new collective 
bargaining agreement, and when the disagreement remained unresolved, the 
employees threatened to strike.85 Hours before the strike began, President 
Truman issued an executive order seizing control of the steel mills because he 
believed that the strike would “immediately jeopardize [the] national defense.”86 
In his concurrence, Justice Burton perhaps came closest to articulating the idea 
that the mere fear of disturbance (to either the domestic order or, as in 
Youngstown, the governmental order) is insufficient when he observed that the 
seizure of the steel mills was “not [in response to] an imminent invasion or 
threatened attack.”87 Safeguarding the national defense is a core governmental 
responsibility, and when the government cannot carry out that responsibility 
effectively, assertive executive action may be justified. But as in Youngstown, a 
mere fear of such interference is insufficient. 
79  Id. at 514. 
80  Id. 
81  In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 592 (1895). 
82  Tinker, 393 U.S at 508. 
83  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
84  See generally id. 
85  Id. at 582–83. 
86  Id. at 583. 
87  Id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring). 
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C. Political Pushback as a Sign of a Well-Functioning Democracy
But what is the value of this political pushback? Why are disruptions to 
the domestic order to be safeguarded? Democracy works well—perhaps even 
works best—when people can freely protest and compel debate on the issues that 
they value. After all, both the Confederacy and the United States were formed 
out of a tradition of dispute.88 
The First Amendment may be as close to a constitutional 
acknowledgement of this tradition and its importance as it gets. From that lens, 
the First Amendment is a constitutional protection for the people and for the 
government. Indeed, President Trump even acknowledged the value of protest in 
a tweet.89 The protests and the First Amendment ensure that the government as a 
whole is getting more information, and more information makes the government 
stronger. Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney v. California90 opinion bolsters 
this argument.91 As Justice Brandeis puts it, “the greatest menace to freedom is 
an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be 
a fundamental principle of the American government.”92 
Of course, there is also an argument that disruptions to the domestic 
order should generally be left to the purview of state governments and only when 
the states can no longer handle them should the president (or perhaps any branch 
of the federal government) act because a threat to the federal government may 
then be imminent. But this argument fails to appreciate the significance of what 
a disruption of the governmental order must truly entail. The governmental order 
is not threatened or disturbed every time states fail to maintain the domestic 
order. Rather, it is threatened in moments like the Civil War or even the Whiskey 
Rebellion when there is a “flagrant violation of federal authority,”93 and the 
Union’s very existence becomes precarious. Indeed, the interferences that occur 
at the state level, including instances like those in Tinker where students engaged 
in political speech in their local school, can spur a larger debate that challenges 
the national government. Those challenges ought to be welcomed by the 
president. Disruptions to the domestic order might often begin with something 
in the purview of the states like schools or police, but only if those threats 
“materially and substantially interfere”94 with the functioning of the national 
government would expansive executive action be potentially justified. To that 
88  See Post & Siegel, supra note 27; see also Paxton-Turner, supra note 27. 
 89  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 22, 2017, 4:47 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/823150055418920960?lang=en (“Watched protests 
yesterday but was under the impression that we just had an election!”). 
90  274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
91  See id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
92  Id. 
93  ELLIS, GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 12. 
94  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
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end, the mere threat of potential governmental disruption by itself is likely not 
enough. 
Returning to Debs is helpful for clarifying the importance of this 
distinction between forms of political pushback. In Debs, a real threat to the 
functioning of the government existed.95 By jeopardizing interstate commerce 
and the federal mail, the labor unrest interfered with the day-to-day operations 
of the government and upset not only the domestic order but also the 
governmental order.96 Part of the governmental order is the balance among 
speech, persuasion, political action, and government activities. More simply, it 
is a balance between government activities and citizen activities. When threats 
are merely to the domestic order, as in speech that challenges government 
activity, the governmental order is still intact. In fact, it is functioning at its best 
because more information is circulating, and the public is fulfilling its duty of 
public discourse.97 But when the disruption of domestic order crosses the line 
and interferes with the balance of the governmental order, then the calculus must 
be different. In Debs, the political action went so far as to disrupt not only “social 
relations, including market relations” but also government activities by 
interfering with interstate commerce and the mail.98 There, the balance of the 
governmental order was tipped too far afield from necessary government 
activities. 
But this must raise the question of what is the point of protest and 
political action if it can never be so great as to interfere directly with government 
activity? This is the wrong question. It is not that such activity can never 
interfere. It is that if it does, then the president may be justified in responses that 
directly limit the protest. The swirl of protest and political action is vital for the 
functioning of the government because then the government has more 
information and can make adjustments.99 When that activity, though, crosses into 
95  See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 592 (1895) (discussing “the general confusion into which the 
interstate commerce of the country was thrown; the forcible interference with that commerce; the 
attempted exercise by individuals of powers belonging only to government, and the threatened 
continuance of such invasions of public right”). 
96  See id. 
 97  See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[T]he greatest menace to freedom 
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental 
principle of the American government.”). 
98  Gordon, supra note 65, at 377. To that end, the labor strikes at issue in Debs appear to have 
escalated to disruptions beyond ordinary disruptions to the domestic order or “the social contract.” 
See OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 47–48 (1993). 
Instead, the strike disrupted “the market,” making government intervention likely more 
appropriate. See id.; Gordon, supra note 65, at 374–75, 378–79. 
99  This even happens in the context of Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra 
note 27, at 375 (discussing “the potentially constructive effects of backlash”). The trajectory from 
Roe to Casey is one such example of the effects of backlash to the extent that in response to the 
backlash after Roe, Casey cuts back on abortion rights. See id. at 429–30. 
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disrupting the governmental order, then it may be that the president is justified 
in intervening and quelling it. But that is not to say that protest should never 
reach those heights. It is only a matter of what types of responses are appropriate 
and when certain executive responses are warranted. 
To that end, although Eugene Debs and the labor unions lost, their 
actions spurred a national dialogue about labor unions that continued for decades 
after the violent strike.100 In fact, 37 years later, Congress passed a decidedly 
pro-labor law, the Norris-La Guardia Act, that, among other things, prevented 
federal courts from issuing injunctions against nonviolent labor strikes.101 All 
this is to say that Debs’s actions alongside organized labor were not wasted. 
III. TESTING THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSES TO POLITICAL
PUSHBACK: THE CONFEDERACY 
President Trump has been sharply criticized for his administration’s 
policies102 as well as his own attitude toward the presidency.103 He has been 
further criticized for his responses to this criticism and political pushback.104 But 
this is not a new story. In fact, when Jefferson Davis was the Confederacy’s 
president, he, too, implemented policies that led to significant protest. Like 
President Trump, Davis struggled to find a role for the presidency that included 
accepting protest and criticism. For Davis, his tenure as the Confederacy’s 
president ended when his nation fell, and it is not a stretch to argue that some of 
his missteps at least contributed to the Confederacy’s downfall.105 This Part first 
100  This conversation has shifted somewhat to the new role that unions should play. See, e.g., 
John Burnett, Old Unions Can’t Cope with the New World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 26, 
2015, 2:15 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/05/26/labor-
unions-need-to-reinvent-themselves. 
101  29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101–115 (West 2019). 
 102  See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, John McCain Becomes Critic in Chief of the Trump 
Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/us/politics/john-mccain-donald-trump-critic.html; Jena 
McGregor, The Problem with Donald Trump’s Blame Game, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/02/21/the-problem-with-donald-
trumps-blame-game/?utm_term=.8693222eba71. 
103  See, e.g., David A. Graham, Trump’s Performative Presidency, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trumps-performative-presidency/516531/ 
(“Yet here is Trump, now ensconced in the White House, not just displaying a vexingly casual 
attitude toward secrecy but flaunting it.”). 
104  See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Donald Trump Just Admitted He’s Incapable of Acknowledging 
Legitimate Criticism, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/02/28/trump-when-asked-to-name-criticisms-he-deserved-no-probably-i-could-
never-do-that/?utm_term=.658928dd39e6. 
105  Some have argued that the South was destined to lose from the beginning. But it is not clear 
that the Confederacy was necessarily destined to lose from the start, even if it did become clear as 
the war progressed that the South was at a severe disadvantage. See PRATT, supra note 2, at xiii 
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discusses Jefferson Davis’s role as the Confederacy’s president before turning to 
some of his responses to political pushback. 
A. Jefferson Davis: The Confederate President
Jefferson Davis was a product of the American political tradition. Before 
he became the Confederacy’s president, Jefferson Davis was President Franklin 
Pierce’s Secretary of War, a member of the House of Representatives, and a 
United States Senator, representing Mississippi.106 He was once referred to as 
“the Cicero of the Senate,” and he cared deeply about “preserv[ing] what he 
always called the Union of ‘our Fathers.’”107 Leaving the United States Senate 
on January 21, 1861, was “the saddest day of [Davis’s] life.”108 But Davis felt he 
had no choice but to follow Mississippi.109 He would soon become the president 
of the Confederacy.110 Despite his tenure as a respected United States Senator,111 
Davis’s tenure as the Confederacy’s president revealed a president whose 
ostensible belief in a small government simultaneously compelled him to expand 
the role of the executive to address threats to this experimental nation’s domestic 
order and survival. In doing so, Davis struggled to accept the political pushback 
that is ultimately necessary to a well-functioning democracy. 
1. A Brief Overview of the Confederacy’s Political Landscape
To put Davis’s responses to pushback in context, a brief overview of the 
Confederacy’s political landscape is necessary. Specifically, this Article 
discusses three important aspects of the Confederacy’s political landscape: 
(1) the Confederacy’s unanticipated centralization and heavy regulation;
(“Put it otherwise: the North’s economic strength had much to do with determining the result of 
the war, but not until events in the war had determined that economic strength would be 
important.”). 
106  WILLIAM J. COOPER, JR., JEFFERSON DAVIS, AMERICAN 3 (2000). 
107  Id. at 3–4. 
108  Id. at 3. 
 109  See id. at 5 (discussing how after learning of Mississippi’s decision to secede, “[Davis] knew 
what he must do”). According to Davis, “‘[t]he stern conviction of necessity, the demand of honor’ 
governed his action.” Id. Davis told former President Pierce that after Mississippi’s decision he 
“c[a]me to the hard task of announcing to [Pierce] that the hour is at hand which closes [his] 
connection with the United States, for the independence and Union of which [his] father bled and 
in the service of which [Davis] . . . sought to emulate the example [his father] set for [his] 
guidance.” Id. 
110  Davis learned of his nomination on February 9, 1861, less than a month after leaving office 
in Washington. Id. at 327–28. In fact, Jefferson Davis was the only person nominated to be the 
Confederacy’s president. Id. at 327. Davis’s inauguration occurred just nine days later on February 
18, 1861. Id. at 329. 
111  Id. at 3. 
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(2) pushback from certain citizens; and (3) pushback from the States alongside
the Confederacy’s lack of intragovernmental processes. Each is discussed in turn.
i. Government Regulation in the Confederacy
Although in 2019 domestic government regulation seems normal, this 
type of domestic regulation was almost unheard of in the United States after the 
War of 1812.112 When the Confederacy enacted government regulation over 
cornerstones of the Confederacy’s domestic life, including food and slaves, 
similar domestic regulation was not a facet of American life to such an extent.113 
This irony has not escaped historians and scholars.114 
This irony is particularly noticeable in the context of the Confederacy’s 
impressment of slaves. As Professor Stephanie McCurry observes, “[f]or a nation 
established to give greater security and permanence to slaveholders’ enjoyment 
of their peculiar property, impressment came as a terrible blow.”115 Slaveholders 
no longer had exclusive control over their slaves. Their government, which was 
designed to protect their rights in their slaves, could impress their slaves into 
service for the Confederacy.116 The domestic order of the Confederacy quickly 
became unmoored from what secessionists initially envisioned.117 Indeed, the 
South had become a place where the social order, particularly as it related to 
slavery, was in the same position as it would have been had the South never 
seceded, particularly if Davis had succeeded in his attempt late in the war in 
arming the slaves and granting them their freedom in return for fighting for the 
112  See JOHN K. MAHON, THE WAR OF 1812, 385 (1972) (discussing how “the central authority 
[seemed to have] grown flabby since the Revolution”); see also RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL,
YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859–1877, at 100 
(1990) (discussing the Confederacy’s more centralized policies than those of the Union). 
113  See BENSEL, supra note 112; see also MCCURRY, supra note 23, at 88 (discussing the growth 
of government power in the Confederacy and “government demands on citizens, subjects, and 
property [that] expanded to previously unthinkable proportions”). 
114  See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 18, at 58–59 (“The Confederate government, albeit 
unwittingly, transformed the South from a state rights confederation into a centralized, national 
state.”). 
115  MCCURRY, supra note 23, at 274. 
 116  Id. Impressment “cut against the power masters had always claimed to govern slaves as their 
personal property.” Id. 
117  See, e.g., id. (discussing “a newly immediate relationship with a central government whose 
former authority over slavery, and even more so over individual slaves, had been strictly 
delimited”). 
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Confederacy.118 This possibility troubled many Southerners.119 Among those 
troubled by the possibility of arming and then emancipating the slaves who 
fought for the South was Representative Foote.120 He argued that if Davis 
“emancipate[d] the slaves without the consent of the several States, [Davis] 
would be made to occupy exactly the same position as Abraham Lincoln.”121 
Perhaps less ironic but equally unusual was the police state that the 
Confederate government created in some places. For example, the Confederate 
government even went so far as to “mess with mountaineers’ apple 
brandy-making”122 by impressing the copper coils from the stills.123 Despite the 
rhetoric of states’ rights, the Confederate government became much more 
centralized and focused on domestic regulation than the Union. When the 
Confederate Congress passed “An Act to Further Provide for the Public 
Defense,”124 its conscription act, it was the first Congress in North America to 
pass such a law.125 Moreover, it was passed nearly a year before the Union would 
pass a similar law.126 The law stated that Davis could 
call out and place in the military service of the Confederate 
States, for three years, unless the war shall have been sooner 
ended, all white men who are residents of the Confederate 
States, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years at the 
time the call or calls may be made, who are not legally exempted 
from military service.127  
The Confederate Congress also created the Conscript Bureau to carry out this 
law.128 
 Certain tax regimes further illustrate just how centralized the Confederate 
government had become. Although many of the Confederacy’s economic 
118  See Currie, supra note 21, at 1300–06. The Confederate Congress eventually decided to 
allow the arming of slaves, but no freedom would be granted to them without the consent of both 
their master and the state. Id. at 1305–06. 
119  See id. at 1300 (Virginia Senator Robert M.T. Hunter responded to this idea by arguing that 
“[w]e dissolved the Union and went to war . . . because we feared the Republicans would free our 
slaves; now our own Government proposes to free them itself.”). 
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policies failed,129 in 1861, it enacted a “war tax” that taxed “slaves, real estate, 
and other forms of property, at a rate of 50 cents per $100 of assessed value.”130 
The Confederacy was never able to collect this tax successfully,131 but its very 
passage reveals the significant centralization and domestic regulation that existed 
across this new government. By 1863, the Confederate Congress desperately 
needed to raise revenue and enacted new taxes, including a direct income tax, a 
tax on professional and business licenses, and an in-kind agricultural tax.132 
Unlike its failed war tax, the Confederacy was able to collect the in-kind 
agricultural tax with some degree of success, in part because it established 
assessors and collectors across the new nation to enforce the tax.133 Indeed, these 
assessors and collectors even collected crops from “the most humble 
farmstead.”134 Again in 1864, the tax regime was revised; this time, the 
Confederate Congress established a 5% tax on land and slaves.135 
But tax regimes are not the end of the story. As to the suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, Davis quickly denounced Lincoln’s suspension of the writ, 
stating “[the Confederacy] may well rejoice that [it] ha[s] forever severed [its] 
connection with a Government that thus tramples on all the principles of 
constitutional liberty, and with a people in whose presence such avowals could 
be hazarded.”136 But Davis later suspended the writ with the Confederate 
Congress’s approval.137 It is worth noting, however, that although habeas corpus 
was only suspended in the Confederacy for fifteen months, some historians 
estimate that “the Confederate military arrested and detained more than 4,000 
individuals,”138 which “angered [at least some Confederate citizens], who saw 
little reason to sacrifice more liberties to a government that seemed as oppressive 
as the one they were fighting.”139 It is not surprising that when the suspension 
expired, “despite Davis’s continued pleas”140 to renew the law, the Confederate 
129  See id. at 262–67. 
130  Id. at 263. 
131  Id. 
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Congress refused to do so.141 For all the talk of a decentralized government, the 
Confederacy was anything but. 
Moreover, although many Southerners may have believed that the 
Confederacy would be a “slaveholding, agricultural, decentralized, Christian 
republic,”142 the Confederacy’s founders drafted the Confederate Constitution 
such that it shared much in common with the United States Constitution, 
including the very provisions, such as the Supremacy clause and the “necessary 
and proper clause,” that supported moves toward centralized government in the 
United States.143 The Confederacy’s founders did not stop there, though. The 
Confederate president was also granted a “line-item veto,” which further 
bolstered executive power.144 As previously mentioned, the Confederacy did not 
shy away from policies such as “conscription, taxation, and suspension of habeas 
corpus.”145 These policies, and the way Davis implemented them, might not 
ordinarily have been expected from a government ostensibly founded on 
decentralization.146 It is unsurprising, then, that Davis received significant 
pushback across the South and was forced to defend these policies, often on the 
grounds of “short-term hardship and sacrifice for the sake of long-term success,” 
as one historian describes it.147 
ii. The Protest and Pushback of Confederate Citizens
While the Confederate government was expanding, many of its citizens 
were starving and its women were taking a stand and demanding protection. 
Although formally citizens, Confederate women were unable to vote,148 and the 
Confederacy’s “body politic [was] the exclusive preserve of white men.”149 
Nevertheless, Confederate women were considered “objects of protection.”150 
Although the government initially used this imagery of protecting women as a 
call to arms to fight the Union, the women later repurposed this image to plead 
with government officials to provide for them and their families.151 With their 
141  Id. 
142  Id. at 255. 
143  Id. at 256. 
144  Id. 
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husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons off fighting, there were fewer men to help 
harvest crops and, in some instances, oversee slaves.152 This absence of men hit 
poor white women particularly hard.153 In response, women across the South 
staged so-called food riots,154 and in doing so, these women helped “reshap[e] 
labor and welfare policy” 155 in the Confederacy. To put the food riots 
(sometimes referred to as bread riots) in context, by spring 1863, drought and 
low food production inflicted famine-like conditions across parts of the 
Confederacy.156 Confederate women believed that the Confederate government 
maintained an essentially secret food supply for the military either in warehouses 
or through agreements with storekeepers.157 To that end, the women organized 
throughout the Confederacy and armed themselves before descending on various 
shops, taking what they wanted after first asking the price, which they denounced 
as “extortion.”158 One of the largest food riots occurred in Richmond in 1863 and 
required Davis to “calm the people” personally.159 Indeed, in Richmond, women 
first headed to the governor’s mansion and demanded that he release emergency 
food supplies.160 Amidst cries of “Bread or blood!” the crowd began to turn 
violent, and militia men and Davis appeared on the scene.161 Davis gave the 
crowd five minutes to disperse, explaining that after five minutes, he would order 
the militia to fire.162 Five minutes passed, and the crowd dispersed.163 But it was 
not all in vain for the protesters. The Confederate government released some of 
its supply of rice, merchants brought out reserve supplies, prices dropped, and 
Congress passed a law requiring planters to convert some of their tobacco or 
cotton acreage to acreage for food crops.164 
But women whose husbands and fathers were off fighting were not the 
only vocal citizens protesting Davis’s policies. Indeed, in North Carolina, 
Mississippi, and Texas, communities of Confederate dissenters formed.165 
Within these communities, certain Southerners actively protested and rebelled 
152  See id. at 190–92 (discussing some of the motivation behind the food riots). 
153  See id. at 7–8. 
154  Id. at 191–92. 
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against secession.166 For example, in the North Carolina Piedmont, a group of 
men focused their energies on “robbing slaveholders and punishing the 
Confederate militia.”167 Further, these communities offered shelter to the 
Confederate deserters.168 The dissent from one of these communities escalated to 
such an extent that the community “allegedly seceded from the Confederacy,” 
requiring the Confederacy to deploy troops to the area to quell the protest.169 
iii. The Pushback from Confederate States and the Lack of
Intragovernmental Processes
Davis also faced pushback from other corners of the fledging nation, 
including from the states and within the Confederate government.170 Importantly, 
within the Confederate government, the traditional political order that valued 
constitutionality of laws was disrupted.171 For example, the Confederacy’s 
executive branch, through the attorneys general, sometimes simply “passed on 
the constitutionality of laws, and their decisions were accepted as final by the 
[Davis] administration.”172 But when others disagreed with these decisions, 
Davis would urge acceptance for the sake of “[c]omity between the different 
[departments].”173 Meanwhile, the states would often flatly ignore many of these 
opinions.174 Further, there could never be a final word on a law’s constitutionality 
because the Confederacy never had its own Supreme Court due to political 
disagreement within the Confederate Congress.175 Although tasked with creating 
a Confederate Supreme Court, the Confederate Congress was never able to fulfill 
this obligation,176 and Davis was never able to work with Congress to prioritize 
and achieve this goal. Beyond these attorneys general opinions, the Confederacy 
did not have a “nationwide” way to resolve legal disputes, so it is easy to see 
how legal disputes could remain unresolved and only further exacerbate the 
political tensions.  
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The political landscape of the Civil War South was replete with 
disruptions to its domestic order regarding issues such as hunger, poverty, the 
possibility of slave impressment, and centralized regulation instead of the 
anticipated emphasis on states’ rights. As the Confederacy’s president, Davis 
came to believe that he had to engage in a more robust exercise of executive 
power, which sometimes included neglecting or silencing pushback, if the 
Confederacy were to survive.177 
2. Davis’s Response to Political Pushback
Understanding Davis’s responses to pushback first requires framing his 
responses against a common view of government in the years leading up to the 
Civil War, that is, the Jeffersonian tradition. To that end, a brief digression 
regarding the Jeffersonian tradition is helpful. Under the Jeffersonian tradition, 
government is small, and in the decades leading up the Civil War, it was a 
foundation for arguments against central authority, making Davis’s apparent 
operation within the Jeffersonian tradition, at least in part, hardly unusual.178 In 
keeping with the Jeffersonian tradition, early legal figures, like Virginia lawyer 
and judge Spencer Roane, emphasized that “the people of this country [are] the 
only sovereign power.”179 In the midst of the federal bank controversy, Roane 
held firm to a view that “[t]he states were the parties to the federal compact and 
had granted only the specific powers and powers fairly incidental to them.”180 
Roane defined his country as that of Virginia and not the entire United 
States.181 This view was not uncommon, particularly in the years after the War 
of 1812, which had severely tested national authority.182 In Hunter v. Martin,183 
the political background against which Davis operated was already developed. 
In that case, the Virginia judges declined to follow the United States Supreme 
Court’s ruling and argued that Supreme Court review of state court decisions was 
177  That something also included “absolute allegiance to the Confederate cause.” COOPER, 
supra note 106, at 365. Simply, Davis was willing to make significant sacrifices, including “setting 
aside . . . states’ rights for the sake of Southern independence,” and he encouraged others to do the 
same. HUEBNER, supra note 1, at 281. 
178  See THOMAS, supra note 18, at 3. 
179  Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 36 (1793). 
 180  Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia: Champion of States’ Rights – Foe of John Marshall, 66 
HARV. L. REV. 1242, 1253 (1953). 
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unconstitutional.184 The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed the 
Virginia Court of Appeals, but resistance to federal authority marked a view of 
government that would influence Civil War politics. It was this Jeffersonian 
tradition that insisted that the “Union was a compact by which the states 
‘constituted a general government for special purposes.’”185 
Decades after Roane advanced this “ultra-Jeffersonian vision” in Martin, 
“Southerners . . . appropriated Jefferson’s position that the Union was a compact 
of sovereign states and reasoned that the ultimate ‘mode and measure of redress’ 
was secession, withdrawal from the compact.”186 Unsurprisingly, Davis operated 
within that tradition.187 And yet, this tradition leaves open a question of the scale 
of executive power. Against this backdrop, when Davis perceived the political 
pushback as threatening the success of the Confederacy, he had no choice but to 
take robust executive action. In other words, when the domestic order was 
disrupted, Davis’s theoretical view of small government made him less likely to 
wait on Congress and more likely to take matters into his own hands, even calling 
for Southerners to adopt a “practical nationalism” for the sake of Southern 
independence.188 
Examples of how this tension between the Jeffersonian tradition and 
strong executive responses are reflected in Davis’s responses to pushback 
abound. To start, there were certain projects, like the railroad connecting 
Greensboro, North Carolina, and Danville, Virginia, that had Congress not 
provided authorization, “Davis would have built it anyway ‘under his own 
authority as the commander-in-chief.’”189 Although that one anecdote comes 
from a Davis biographer without documentation,190 the anecdote captures the 
spirit of Davis’s view of small government and executive power. Fast forward to 
2019, and this anecdote is eerily similar to President Trump’s decision to build 
the wall at the Mexican border. 
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Although Davis was willing to wait on Congress on certain issues like 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus,191 Davis also incorporated a “vigorous use 
of the veto power”192 into his executive power. In fact, he used the veto power 
“more liberally than any U.S. President before Grover Cleveland—not only on 
constitutional grounds, which practically everyone conceded was appropriate, 
but also for reasons of mere disagreement with congressional policy, which had 
been more controversial in the United States.”193 For Davis, executive power had 
to be protected from “congressional encroachment,” and the veto power could 
do just that.194 
Davis’s response to the food riots is another example of this assertive 
executive power. In one instance, Davis tried to “ban the telegraph office from 
relaying news of the riot out of the city.”195 Although Davis later acknowledged 
the significance of women’s support—or lack thereof—and “bid openly for their 
loyalty and leadership in a campaign against desertion,”196 his attempts to cut off 
their protests showcased an expanded and exaggerated role for the president. 
When protest and pushback became newsworthy, as happened with the food 
riots, Davis tried to stymie the very flow of information that encouraged such 
pushback in the first place.197 Although Davis, unlike some presidents, was not 
subject to “widespread personal hostility,” he faced criticism of certain 
policies198 and found himself leading citizens, who were increasingly frustrated 
by the lack of protection and their growing poverty.199 Of course, it cannot be 
forgotten that Davis was a wartime president, and whether he would have taken 
the same approach if the survival of the Confederacy did not hang in the balance 
is unknowable. That said, his responses remain worthy of examination and likely 
cannot all be written off as the consequence of war. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly as a wartime president, Davis also faced 
significant criticism of his war policy.200 As a graduate of West Point and a war 
191  See id. at 1327–28 (“Unlike President Lincoln, moreover, Davis never claimed such power 
for himself; he thrice asked Congress to suspend the writ, and when Congress finally declined[,] 
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hero of the Mexican-American War,201 Davis had reason to have confidence in 
his own military expertise.202 When Davis’s military prowess met his new role 
as president of the Confederacy, Davis became a micro-manager of his 
generals.203 For example, he would write directly to his generals and issue 
directives.204 Davis also felt that “he had to maintain a visible military presence 
throughout his country, or . . . face ‘dissatisfaction, distress, [and] desertion of 
soldiers.’”205 He could hardly stay away from the military campaign while he 
struggled to listen to the women and other Confederate citizens and understand 
that their protests were about more than just empty stomachs. Their protests were 
also about administrative change that if left ignored would actually encourage 
desertion of Davis’s soldiers.206 Specifically, Confederate women not only 
desperately wanted their new government to take care of their husbands and 
fathers who were serving in the Confederate army but also to take care of the 
Confederate citizens who did not go to war.207 As previously discussed, the 
women sought basic necessities like food as well as help on their farms.208 As 
long as Davis ignored them, they would continue writing to their husbands, 
fathers, brothers, and sons to come home and help—to desert.209 If the 
Confederate government would not change its ways, then its women would 
deprive the government of the one thing it would never have enough of: soldiers. 
Similarly, the communities within Confederate states dedicated to rebelling 
against secession would also continue to deprive the Confederacy of soldiers and 
require the Confederacy to divert its already scarce resources to manage these 
protests and rebellions.210 Davis realized this, but perhaps a little too late. 
Pushback aside, Davis believed that he was acting with deep patriotism 
with his administration’s policies, and that “he had overcome the ambition that 
had been so central in his career both because of his absolute allegiance to the 
Confederate cause and because he was at the top.”211 His role as the Confederate 
president included a personal conviction in “suppress[ing] all personal concerns” 
and a conviction that Confederate independence could only be won if 
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“Confederates [also] . . . put aside or suppress[ed] all personal concerns.”212 
Although he recognized that many of his citizens were in need,213 “the cause . . . 
bec[a]me all-encompassing for him.”214 To that end, Davis was compelled to 
perceive political pushback as interfering with his understanding of “the cause,” 
which required “suppressing personal concerns.”215 
B. Lessons Learned
What do Davis’s responses to political pushback reveal about how a 
president should respond to protest or criticism in times of great disagreement? 
First, and no doubt easier said than done, it is imperative that the president know 
how to manage the meaningful political pushback that may come from the 
people, from the states, or even from other parts of the federal government. 
Indeed, Davis received pushback from all three. The women protested with the 
food riots,216 the states often ignored orders from the Confederate government,217 
and within the Confederate government, Davis received pushback from Congress 
on various issues, including the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, which, 
as previously discussed Congress declined to renew.218 Unsurprisingly, Davis 
also received pushback from Congress when it came to arming and possibly 
emancipating the slaves who fought for the Confederacy,219 after many 
“members of the Confederate Congress spent more time considering their 
self-interest as slaveholders than the needs of the Confederacy as a whole.”220 
But Davis also faced general criticism from the Confederate Congress regarding 
military decisions.221 In fact, just days after giving his inaugural address, a 
“resolution [was introduced] in the House calling for the investigation of the 
capture of [a Confederate fort] with the consequent evacuation of Nashville, and 
of the capitulation of Roanoke Island.”222 Along those lines, a bill was passed in 
the Senate and the House to limit Davis’s military power by reducing “his 
secretary of war [to] a mere bureau clerk,” and creating an “office of a 
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commanding general of the armies of the Confederate States.”223 This bill, 
however, ultimately did not survive after Davis vetoed it, citing the Confederate 
Constitution as vesting the powers the bill assigned to the “office of commanding 
general” with the commander-in-chief.224 It is a fine and difficult balance 
between not interfering with political pushback and ensuring that the government 
systems are not ignoring the new information that the pushback provides. 
Second, although it may be tempting simply to veto Congress225 and 
“micro-manage” certain departments or even attempt to micro-manage the 
states,226 to do so would be a mistake. After all, the Confederacy did not survive, 
and even during its short existence, it was hardly a well-functioning 
government.227 
What is also clear is that when citizens voiced their opinion to the 
Confederate government, they spurred a public discussion and fulfilled an 
important political duty. Their determination and persistence paid off on some 
level—Davis recognized the value of their political support.228 Things might 
have been different for Davis had he listened sooner and more closely.229 
Similarly, protests and pushback that percolate at the state level should not be 
wholly ignored. Of course, the president need not intervene unless the ordinary 
functioning of the national government is in jeopardy. But in the Confederacy’s 
case, Davis may have been better off not simply allowing the states to ignore the 
opinions of his attorneys general. 
Simply put, Davis’s responses reveal that mismanaging political 
pushback worked against establishing a thriving government. Although likely 
not the only reason the Confederacy fell, there is every reason to think that 
Davis’s poor response to political pushback was at least a contributing factor. 
Specifically, Confederate citizens were hungry. Soldiers were deserting. There 
was no Supreme Court. Pockets of Confederate states actively rebelled against 
the Confederacy and diverted the Confederacy’s scarce resources. Taxes could 
not be collected, and Davis could not effectively navigate these problems. 
Navigating these problems successfully would have necessarily required Davis 
to process and address the information that the political pushback generated. 
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Instead, Davis merely focused on his own obsession with the cause230 and did 
not adequately respond to the political pushback. 
It is also evident that at least some of the pushback, such as that from the 
Confederate women, did not materially and substantially interfere with the 
government’s ability to function or carry out its core responsibilities. The careful 
observer may point out that the Confederate women were jeopardizing Davis’s 
ability to maintain an army. After all, these women effectively were encouraging 
desertion in some instances—something Davis later acknowledged when he tried 
to court women’s support.231 The operation of the military is certainly included 
within the vital aspects of a well-functioning government. But in the case of the 
Confederacy, the women no more prevented the maintenance of an army than 
the anti-war protesters on college campuses during Vietnam prevented the 
maintenance of an army. Rather, the women called attention to government 
policies and practices. In the end, the Confederacy was still able to maintain its 
army; the women did not force the government to come to a grinding halt. 
Importantly, the Confederate women (among other protesters Davis 
faced) could only interfere with the domestic order and the functioning of the 
government to the extent that they could persuade others of their objections to 
the executive’s policies. To be fair, if the only objective the Confederate women 
achieved was to incite some of the men to desert, then that incitement could likely 
have been independently criminalized. In the end, these protests highlight how a 
president’s response to pushback has as much to do with the success of the 
government as the actual activities and policies of the government. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSES TO POLITICAL PUSHBACK
TODAY 
This Part first turns to the current political climate, importing some of 
the lessons learned from Davis’s time as the Confederate president. Second, this 
Part considers some of President Trump’s responses to the protest and pushback 
that he has encountered. Third, this Part reflects on the lessons from Davis’s 
responses and the tension between government-in-theory and 
government-in-practice that those lessons reveal. 
A. Donald Trump: America’s Current President
Donald J. Trump was elected the 45th President of the United States.232 
Before becoming president, President Trump was a businessman.233 Indeed, the 
230  COOPER, supra note 106, at 365. 
231  Id. at 206. 
 232  Donald J. Trump, 45th President of the United States, WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/people/donald-j-trump/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2019). 
233  See id. 
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presidency was the first political office he ran for.234 From the moment President 
Trump was elected, he has faced significant political pushback. During this time 
of great public and political disagreement, the lessons from Davis’s responses to 
political pushback are especially compelling. 
1. A Brief Overview of the Current Political Landscape
Much like Davis, President Trump is a president in a time of deep 
political turmoil. In 2019, many women, much like their Confederate 
counterparts (who they might be loath to find a parallel with at first blush), are 
at the forefront of the protests that are seeking to reform welfare policy and 
improve basic human rights.235 For example, much of the current pushback 
focuses on rights for transgender Americans, women, immigrants, and the 
poor.236 At the same time, President Trump has also engaged in the rhetoric of 
“protection” as to the nation’s borders, businesses, and unborn children.237 
Although the rhetoric of “protection” is used on both sides of the political aisle, 
it is used to communicate intensely different messages.238 
Moreover, like Davis, President Trump has faced state attorneys general, 
who oppose his policies. Shortly after President Trump’s inauguration, 17 
attorneys general “signed a letter vowing to ‘use all of the tools of our offices to 
234  Id. 
 235  See, e.g., Gretchen Frazee, What the Women’s March Wants, PBS: NEWS HOUR (Jan. 18, 
2017, 2:23 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/womens-march-wants/. See also What the 
Women’s March Stands For, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/opinion/what-the-womens-march-stands-for.html  
(discussing the following as just some of the things that the Women’s March stands for: 
“[a]ffordable birth control[,] [e]qual pay for equal work[,] [f]ull access to health care for 
transgender Americans”). 
236  See, e.g., Hansi Lo Wang, Protesters Prepare for Women’s March After Trump’s 
Inauguration, NPR: TWO-WAY (Jan. 20, 2017, 1:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/01/20/510706246/protesters-prepare-for-womens-march-after-trumps-inauguration. 
237  See, e.g., President Donald J. Trump Wants to Fully Secure Our Border and Reform Our 
Immigration System to Put America First, WHITE HOUSE (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-wants-to-fully-
secure-our-border-and-reform-our-immigration-system-to-put-america-first/; see also Dave 
Boyer, Trump Says Amid N.Y., Va. Abortion Controversies: U.S. Must Protect Children ‘Born and 
Unborn’, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/feb/7/donald-trump-says-ny-va-abortion-
controversies-us-/. 
238  For example, the media is littered with sound bites about protecting the border, protecting 
immigrants, protecting a woman’s right to choose, and protecting unborn children. Compare, e.g., 
President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 15, 2019) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-border-security-
victory/, with Trump’s Wall Gets America Nowhere on Border Security, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/opinion/trump-wall-immigration.html. 
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fight this unconstitutional order,’”239 referring to Executive Order 13,769, 
otherwise known as the travel ban, which “temporarily close[d] the U.S. to all 
refugees and all people from seven majority-Muslim countries and bar[red] 
Syrian refugees indefinitely.”240 But pushback from state attorneys general has 
not stopped at that initial letter: 
[19] state AGs [have since] sued [the Trump administration] to
stop [it] from withholding Obamacare subsidies from states, 16
to halt the rollback of environmental regulations, and 20 to
reverse its decision to rescind a program that had protected
young immigrants brought to the U.S. illegally as children from
deportation.241
President Trump has also faced significant pushback within the federal 
government, something Davis faced and something every president faces on 
some level. For example, President Trump’s first version of his Executive Order 
suspending “the entry of foreign nationals from seven countries—Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—that had been previously identified 
by Congress or prior administrations as posing heightened terrorism risks”242 was 
blocked by the lower courts.243 Although the Supreme Court ultimately upheld a 
revised version of the so-called “travel ban,” President Trump nevertheless faced 
multiple challenges in the lower courts.244 President Trump has also faced 
pushback in the lower courts regarding construction of the border wall,245 though 
the Supreme Court has allowed construction as the litigation proceeds.246 In 
Congress, President Trump has faced pushback as well on any number of issues 
ranging from the confirmation of Justice Kavanaugh247 to the Mueller Report.248 
Additionally, at the end of 2018 and into early 2019, pushback and significant 
disagreement over how to handle immigration concerns culminated in the longest 
239  Democratic State Attorneys General Begin Trump Pushback, CNBC (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/31/democratic-state-attorneys-general-begin-trump-
pushback.html. 
240  Id. 
241  Neuhauser, supra note 22. 
 242  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018); see also Protecting the Nation from Foreign 
Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (2017). 
243  See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
244  See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403–04. 
245  Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
246  Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 19A60, 2019 WL 3369425 (U.S. July 26, 2019). 
 247  See Everything on Brett Kavanaugh, the Senate Vote and the Fallout, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/us/politics/kavanaugh-news-fbi-investigation.html. 
248  See Anthony Zurcher, Mueller Report: Five Looming Legal Battles Between Congress and 
Trump, BBC NEWS (May 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48138636. 
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government shutdown in American history.249 In that moment, a healthy debate 
escalated to a disruption to the governmental order. Most recently, pushback 
from within the government has taken the form of an impeachment inquiry about 
an alleged request to the Ukrainian government for personal political gain.250 
2. President Trump Takes Action
Unlike Davis, President Trump has faced significant personal 
hostility.251 But very much like Davis, President Trump has taken robust 
executive action, often breaking with the Republican tradition of “limited 
government.”252 In other words, Davis broke with his own Jeffersonian principles 
and the anticipated states’ rights focus of the Confederacy, and President Trump 
broke with party principles and contradicted certain statements about returning 
power to the states and the American people.253 For President Trump, the border 
wall is only one such example of executive action that oversteps what is 
commonly expected, even in an era where domestic regulation is common. 
Moreover, this action is a prime example of how President Trump may not have 
fully appreciated or responded to the concerns of the protesters. President 
Trump’s interpretation of what it means to protect the nation’s vulnerable 
citizens as well as the nation’s diverse heritage appears to be inconsistent or in 
tension with the protesters’ vision of what protection from the President looks 
like.254 
249  See Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gates, & Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was the 
Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html. 
250  See Fandos, supra note 26. 
 251  See COOPER, supra note 106, at 444 (“This band of viciously hostile critics remained small. 
They never managed to stir up formidable personal animosity toward the president . . . .”). 
252  Indeed, in his inaugural address, President Trump observed that his inauguration was “not 
merely transferring power from one administration to another, or from one party to another— 
but . . . transferring power from Washington, D.C. and giving it back to you, the American People.” 
Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017). In 
another statement, President Trump stated that he would “make states the laboratories of 
democracy once again.” Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America, Remarks in 
Meeting with the National Governors Association (Feb. 27, 2017) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-meeting-national-
governors-association/). But President Trump is hardly the first president to champion the 
sovereignty of the people and then exercise his executive power quite differently. See, e.g., ELLIS,
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 20 (discussing this tension in the context of Thomas Jefferson’s 
political principles and the Louisiana Purchase). 
253  See Ross Douthat, The Era of Limited Government Is Over, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/opinion/conservatives-republicans-trump.html. 
254  Compare President Trump’s Bold Immigration Plan for the 21st Century, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 21, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/president-trumps-bold-
immigration-plan-21st-century/, with Ruthie Epstein, The Immigration System Is Inhumane. The 
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When it comes to women’s rights, this inconsistency is even more stark. 
For example, for many protesters, protecting women’s rights includes, among 
other interpretations, maintaining access to contraception and creating equality 
in the workplace.255 Notwithstanding these concerns, President Trump signed an 
order that stopped many women’s access to contraception around the globe, and 
he signed this order within a week of the Women’s March.256 Debate on this topic 
has only gained further traction with the recent passage of various abortion bans 
in certain states.257 
As to President Trump’s specific response to some of the protesters, 
these responses sometimes share similarities with how Davis tried to quell the 
women protesting during his time in office. For example, President Trump’s 
initial response to the Women’s March was a tweet saying the following: 
“Watched protests yesterday but was under the impression that we just had an 
election!”258 Although President Trump later followed up with another tweet 
about peaceful protests as a hallmark of democracy, this later tweet is much like 
Davis’s later realization that he needed to recognize the influence of the women 
protesting the Confederacy—too little, too late. 
As already mentioned, President Trump has also adopted a rhetoric 
focused on protecting America from various threats.259 Sometimes the most 
important response to pushback is selecting the appropriate rhetoric. Indeed, 
responding to protest is a performative act, and President Trump, through his 
rhetoric and tweets, further highlights the significance and impact of this point. 
For example, President Trump’s rhetoric in response to the riots that erupted in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, at a white supremacist rally demonstrate just how 
Next President Must Dismantle It., ACLU.ORG (June 17, 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigration-system-inhumane-next-president-
must-dismantle-it. 
255  See Susan Chira & Yamiche Alcindor, Defiant Voices Flood U.S. Cities as Women Rally 
for Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/us/women-march-
protest-president-trump.html. The protesters are also seeking protection for immigrants, the 
environment, and voter rights. Id. The protesters’ concerns further include police brutality and 
mass incarceration. Id. 
256  Nicholas Kristof, Trump’s War on Women Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/opinion/president-trumps-war-on-women-begins.html. 
257  See Laurel Wamsley, Across the Country, Protesters Rally to Stop States’ Abortion Bans, 
NPR (May 21, 2019, 3:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/21/725410050/across-the-country-
protesters-rally-to-stop-states-abortion-bans. 
258  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 22, 2017, 4:47 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/823150055418920960?lang=en. 
259  For example, in his inaugural address, President Trump emphasized “protecting” America. 
Trump, Inaugural Address, supra note 252. Recently, the focus of such protection has centered 
around immigration. See, e.g., President Donald J. Trump Is Ensuring Non-Citizens Do Not Abuse 
Our Nation’s Public Benefit, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ensuring-non-
citizens-not-abuse-nations-public-benefit/. 
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powerful rhetoric can be. In that instance, President Trump only engendered 
further criticism and pushback by failing to condemn racism in his initial 
remarks.260 In this way, President Trump may pay more attention than Davis ever 
did to how his response will be received, particularly how some of his supporters 
will receive it. But the question remains what is the appropriate response? Is a 
response directed towards, for example, the political base or certain supporters 
the most appropriate response? More recently, President Trump has tried to 
clarify when he does not support the language of some of his supporters. For 
example, he explained that he did not condone the “send her back” chant 
regarding Representative Ilhan Omar.261 In this instance, perhaps, President 
Trump was attempting to offer a response directed to a broader audience. 
As discussed above, selecting an appropriate response to pushback is no 
small task and was a significant problem for Davis.262 Indeed, Davis’s struggle 
with disruptions to the domestic order of the Confederacy are eerily similar to 
some of President Trump’s struggles with pushback, particularly disruptions to 
the domestic order. But to be fair, neither Davis nor President Trump was left 
with an easy task. Nevertheless, at times, both have appeared to take on an 
exaggerated sense of executive power in responding to disruptions to the 
domestic order. As the next Section discusses, this problem may well be the root 
of problematic responses to political pushback. 
3. The Role of Government in Theory and in Practice
The lessons from Davis’s responses provide important insights for the 
modern era. Perhaps most relevant for this Article is the tension between an 
260  See generally Samuel Perry, President Trump and Charlottesville: Uncivil Mourning and 
White Supremacy, 8 J. CONTEMP. RHETORIC 1, 57 (2018); see also Katy Tur, Two Years After 
Charlottesville, A Look at President Trump’s Rhetoric, MSNBC (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.msnbc.com/katy-tur/watch/two-years-after-charlottesville-a-look-at-president-
trump-s-rhetoric-65946693532. 
261  Seung Min Kim, John Wagner, Rachel Bade & Mike DeBonis, Trump Says He Disagrees 
with ‘Send Her Back!’ Chant Directed at Rep. Omar During Rally Despite His Previous ‘Go Back’ 
Tweet, WASH. POST (July 18, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/some-republicans-
condemn-chant-at-trump-rally-but-stand-by-his-characterizations-of-four-minority-
lawmakers/2019/07/18/dded4b92-a962-11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.html. 
262  For instance, Davis got sidetracked with his own “all-encompassing” “commitment to the 
cause” and worried about a lack of commitment from others anytime he “detected others acting for 
personal advantage.” COOPER, supra note 106, at 365. Davis also was (rightly) concerned about 
not having enough manpower to fight the war but struggled to link the women’s concerns with the 
soldiers’ desertion until later on during the Civil War. MCCURRY, supra note 23, at 206. The 
women and those not as committed to the cause as Davis were likely not going to bring down the 
Confederacy. But by failing to receive this type of pushback, Davis’s executive actions were not 
as effective as they could have been. After all, when all was said and done, the South never could 
come up with enough manpower, and the Confederacy fell. 
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outward idea of less robust federal government responsibility263 and a more 
robust role for executive authority in practice. In other words, a president who 
imagines a less robust role for government may think that the slow processes of 
legislation will not adequately, effectively, or timely address a problem that 
seems to threaten the domestic order or governmental order. In fact, this type of 
president might worry that a disruption to the domestic order will inevitably 
escalate to disruption to the governmental order before the legislative processes 
have accomplished anything. Under this view, a natural inclination would be to 
address the issue quickly by adopting a broad sense of executive power. 
This tension that Davis experienced and, on some level, President Trump 
has also experienced264—small government but robust presidential power—is 
not unique to them. President William Howard Taft wrote about a similar 
problem in criticizing President Theodore Roosevelt.265 According to Taft, “the 
president’s power to act depends on the existence of some demonstrable legal 
source of authority.”266 Although Taft thought that Article II powers included 
broad executive action, he also recognized the institutional limits and, most 
importantly for this Article, “the impact of public opinion on the practical 
exercise of executive authority.”267 Public opinion, including protest, can and 
should influence executive authority. When a president fails to respond or 
263  For example, Davis ostensibly believed in states’ rights, perhaps most notably in the lead 
up to the Civil War and his own congressional campaign before the Civil War. COOPER, supra note 
106, at 109 (discussing how “Davis emblazoned states’ rights . . . on the Democratic banner” on 
which he campaigned). That said, during the war, Davis “cultivated the idea of setting aside . . . 
states’ rights for the sake of Southern independence,” promoting a “practical nationalism that 
called for short-term hardship and sacrifice for the sake of long-term success.” HUEBNER, supra 
note 1, at 281. President Trump also promised small government on some level. See, e.g., Ron 
Grossman, Trump’s Cabinet May Fulfill GOP Promise of Small Government—For Better or 
Worse, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 13, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-trump-
cabinet-grossman-20161213-story.html. 
264  See, e.g., Zachary B. Wolf, Trump Wants Radically Less Government. Here’s What That 
Looks Like., CNN POL. (June 15, 2019, 1:46 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/12/politics/trump-deregulation/index.html. See also Donald J. 
Trump, President of the United States of America, Presidential Proclamation for Loyalty Day 2019 
(Apr. 30, 2019) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/presidential-proclamation-loyalty-day-2019/) (“As Americans, we recommit to preserving 
our liberty and the framework of limited government that safeguards it from abuse.”). It is true that 
President Trump has not always personally touted the traditional Republican party message of 
small government, though he has at least made reference to the importance of states’ rights and 
limiting regulations. See, e.g., Michael Stratford, Trump Endorses States’ Rights—But Only When 
He Agrees with the State, POLITICO (Apr. 2, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/02/trump-states-rights-education-sanctuary-drilling-
492784. 
265 H. Jefferson Powell, Editor’s Introduction to WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF 
MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS xxvi (H. Jefferson Powell ed., 2002). 
266  Id. at xxvii. 
267  Id. at xxxi. 
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consider the public’s concerns in a meaningful way, he has not only failed in his 
executive duties but has also put his government’s healthy functioning at risk. 
How? Quite simply, public opinion plays a central role in shaping the country’s 
policies through the democratically accountable branches, which include the 
executive.268 Overcoming this tension, then, may be the key to an effective and 
tempered executive response to political pushback. 
V. CONCLUSION
The parallels between Davis and President Trump and their responses to 
pushback and protest reveal important aspects of how presidents should 
catalogue and respond to such pushback and protest. It is especially important in 
the modern era to learn as much as possible from Jefferson Davis who watched 
his administration and his “country” fall. National memory often focuses on the 
Vietnam era and the Civil Rights Movement when thinking about protest and 
political turmoil.269 But, the Civil War and the internal conflict within the 
Confederacy provide equally valuable lessons for navigating political turmoil. 
Because the Confederacy fell, Davis provides a unique opportunity to 
understanding the significance of presidential responses to pushback and protest. 
Indeed, the lessons Davis never learned may be especially important for a 
president confronted with what could be the ultimate form of pushback: a formal 
impeachment inquiry. 
When confronted with a disturbance, an American president who 
believes in small government or who does not believe in the effectiveness of 
legislation may be less likely to wait for congressional or judicial action. The 
tension between wanting to follow the Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights and 
wanting to maintain the domestic order can quickly lead to a robust exercise of 
executive power, which may result in missing the point of the political pushback 
in the first place. The disruptions to the domestic order are usually a good thing 
because they engender widespread debate and bring attention to the people’s 
values and concerns. Squaring a tolerance, and even support, of protest with 
robust executive power is not always easy. But that is what must be done. That 
is the lesson for modern presidents, and the lesson Davis learned too late. 
268  See id. at xxxii–iii. 
 269  See Sarah Jaffe, Echoes of Vietnam-Era Protests in Today’s Demonstrations, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/echoes-of-vietnam-era-protests-in-
todays-demonstrations/2017/02/02/abc0f896-cc59-11e6-a747-
d03044780a02_story.html?utm_term=.05c83bcf0f23. 
